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a b s t r a c t
New developments in consumption-based emissions accounting suggest that the reductions claimed by
wealthy, environmentally progressive nations have often come at the expense of increased emissions
elsewhere e and thus net growth in global GHG concentrations. This paper traces Sweden's attempts to
translate growing recognition of displaced emissions into national environmental policy. Drawing on
multi-sited ethnographic research and policy analysis in Sweden and China, we argue that while the
logical implications of consumption-based analyses point to the need to address production and con-
sumption as an integrated system, complex governance challenges and the political precariousness of
these ideas have thus far limited policy to the reinvention of consumer awareness campaigns and an
international extension of long-standing ecological efﬁciency efforts. We argue that consumption-based
emissions indicators justify more ambitious demand-side policy response.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction: the climate impact of consumption
Concerned about climate change, many nations have responded
with mitigation efforts focused on improving domestic energy ef-
ﬁciencies e often with notable success (Weidner and Mez, 2008;
EEA, 2013). However, a large and growing body of research has
documented the cannibalization of these domestic improvements
by sustained growth in consumption and the emissions embedded
in international trade (Munksgaard et al., 2002; SEPA, 2012c). More
disturbing, many lend empirical support to the assertion that na-
tional efforts to decouple economic growth from ecological harm
can result in displaced environmental impact and net growth in
global emissions (Peters and Hertwich, 2008; Peters et al., 2011).
Drawing on these ﬁndings, this paper addresses the signiﬁcant
climate impact of what the European Environmental Agency (EEA,
2012b) has suggested is the “mother of all environmental issues”;
consumption. As living standards and ideologies of need continue
to “ratchet up” (Shove, 2004) in both developed and developing
economies, the emissions embodied in internationally traded
consumer goods are increasingly signiﬁcant drivers of global GHG
concentrations. Peters and colleagues (2011b) argue that 28% of
global emissions are already embodied in international trade, a
portion that is only projected to increase with intensiﬁed global-
ization and market liberalization (Sato, 2012).
While there have been signiﬁcant advancements in methodol-
ogies to analyze the climate impact of growing consumption levels
and carbon-rich international supply chains (Davis and Caldeira,
2010b; Davis et al., 2011; Peters et al., 2012, 2011; Wiedmann,
2009), efforts to incorporate these insights into international ne-
gotiations have been marginalized (see Atkinson et al., 2011;
Carmondy, 2009; Isenhour, 2012; Mattoo et al., 2009; Petherick,
2012). National policies to address the climate impact of con-
sumption are also extremely rare (Broadhag, 2010) due to the
complex governance challenges presented by global supply chains.
Only a few nations have measured the global impact of their con-
sumption, and even fewer have attempted to utilize them to inform
climate policy (Barrett et al., 2013).
This paper traces one such effort in Sweden e the ﬁrst nation to
ofﬁcially recognize the displaced climate impact of their con-
sumption. We explore how this wealthy and environmentally
progressive nation has attempted to translate these ﬁndings into
politically viable environmental policy. The Swedish case has sig-
niﬁcant international relevance given that Sweden is internation-
ally celebrated as a successful example of ecological-economic
decoupling, a strategy that has been highlighted as a signiﬁcant
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policy goal in both the EU's 7th Environmental Action Plan (EEA,
2013) and in international discussions about the “green economy”
(UN 2012).
Yet consumption-based emissions indicators challenge claims
that economic growth and ecological harm can be absolutely
decoupled. Instead, they point to the need for “strong sustainable
consumption” policies that move beyond improving the efﬁciency
of consumption to address consumer demand and reduce absolute
material and energy consumption (Lorek and Fuchs, 2013). It is
widely recognized that ecological modernization's focus on efﬁ-
ciency and neoliberalism's focus on consumer choice have com-
bined to dominate sustainability rhetoric and practice, but that they
do very little to address issues of environmental justice, rebound
effects or growing global consumption levels.
Our analysis of policy formation in response to these concerns is
based on ethnographic and mixed-methods research in Sweden
and China between 2007 and 2014. Data include analysis of
Swedish and EU policy documents published between 2008 and
2014 as well as interviews with 35 representatives of 25 Scandi-
navian governmental and non-governmental organizations
including the Swedish EPA, Ministry for the Environment and
Consumer Agency. To animate this policy formation process and
associated challenges, we focus particular attention on Sweden's
efforts to lend technological assistance to the People's Republic of
China. We thus also incorporate research on Sino-Swedish climate
cooperation which included additional policy reviews, secondary
research and interviews with three Swedish and two Chinese
climate policy analysts in Stockholm and Beijing during the sum-
mer of 2012 and 2014.
Our argument proceeds as follows: we begin with background
and a theoretical rationale for the Swedish casee highlighting both
domestic and international claims that Sweden has successfully
decoupled economic growth from ecological harm. The second
section traces Sweden's attempts to translate a growing awareness
of displaced emissions into policy through: 1) domestic mitigation
and efﬁciency improvements, 2) consumer education and 3) in-
ternational policy speciﬁcally via technological transfer to
producer-nations such as the People's Republic of China. The fourth
section discusses our ﬁndings relative to recent debates about the
need for strong sustainable consumption policy. Our conclusion
reiterates the argument that our understandings of displaced
emissions and the climate impact of consumption justify more
ambitious demandeside policy than it has generated to date e in
Sweden and abroad.
2. Swedish decoupling and global markets: theory and
background
Sweden is internationally celebrated as a positive example of
economic-ecological decoupling, or the effort to separate economic
growth from ecological harm. According to Kyoto reporting re-
quirements, the state's emissions taxes and signiﬁcant investments
in technological improvements have resulted in a 20% reduction in
GHG emissions since 1990 (SEPA, 2013). While this accomplish-
ment is notable in itself, state documents emphasize that these
reductions were achieved during a period of signiﬁcant overall
growth. Between 1990 and 2010 efﬁciency measures and simulta-
neous economic growth resulted in a 72% reduction in the carbon
intensity of the national economy (SEPA, 2012a, TCO 2012), leading
many in Sweden and abroad to declare decoupling an over-
whelming success, one worthy of international replication (OECD,
2004; UNEP, 2011) (Fig. 1).
During the last decade, however, there have been signiﬁcant
improvements in and a subsequent “explosion” (Carmondy,
2009) of robust consumption-based environmental indicators
that call into question claims of successful decoupling (EEA,
2014). These include tools to measure per capita water
(Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012), biodiversity (Lenzen et al.,
2012) and nitrogen use (Leach et al., 2012). More central to
our discussion here is the signiﬁcant reﬁnement of research on
carbon footprints (e.g. Berglund, 2011; Sato, 2012) and a
growing number of increasingly robust databases, analytical
tools and studies which account for the emissions embedded in
international trade (Davis et al., 2011; Peters and Hertwich,
2008; Peters et al., 2011).
In contrast to the production-based emissions inventories used
in the UNFCCC reporting processes, which account for GHGs
released within a given set of geo-political boundaries, consump-
tion based emissions capture both direct and indirect emissions
associated with the goods and services a nation's citizens consume
(e.g. Davis and Caldeira, 2010b; Feng et al., 2013; Peters et al., 2011),
regardless of where theywere produced (domestic electronics, toys
from China, clothing from Bangladesh or beef from Argentina). The
total global emissions are essentially the same, but the
consumption-based method sheds light on emissions drivers
(Peters et al., 2012) and suggests an alternative distribution of re-
sponsibility. As Dawkins and her colleagues write, “territorial
emissions tell us where the emissions occur, but the consumption
approach tells us why the emissions occur. Increasing demand for
Fig. 1. Swedish decoupling of GHG from GNP.
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products and services drives up emissions around the world”
(2010:1).
As the carbon intensity of the Swedish economy has improved
over the last several decades, scholars and environmentalists have
noted a strong parallel trend - signiﬁcant growth in household
disposable income. During the 20th century Swedish consumption
expenditures doubled nearly every thirty years (SEPA, 2012d). Be-
tween 2000 and 2008 alone growing consumer demand in Sweden
contributed to a 40% increase in imports (SEPA, 2012b:15). This
phenomenon is mirrored in several wealthy and environmentally
progressive European economies (Barrett et al., 2013, Petherick,
2012). The European Environmental Agency estimates that while
domestic efﬁciencies resulted in reduced direct energy use within
the EU-27 between 2000 and 2007, overall resource use per person
increased by 9.1%, largely due to an increase in the per capita
consumption of indirect energy, resources and emissions embodied
in imported consumer goods (EEA, 2012a).
Increased awareness of the global climate and environmental
impact of production and consumption led Sweden's Environ-
mental Objectives Commission to propose in 2008 that,
“,…it is essential to change patterns of production and consump-
tion, not only in Sweden, but in large parts of the world. It is pro-
posed that Statistics Sweden should be commissioned to develop
indicators to measure the environmental impacts of Swedish con-
sumption in other parts of the world” (2008:10).
The proposal was approved and, in November of the same year
the Swedish EPA released a report entitled Konsumptionens Kli-
matpåverkan, translated in 2010 with the English title “The Climate
Impact of Swedish Consumption.” The report found that, in contrast
to previous production-based emissions reports which suggested
that Swedish GHG emissions were below 1990 levels,
consumption-based accounting revealed that growing consumer
demand had contributed to a 25% increase in emissions over the
same time period. Several international organizations including the
EU and OECD have joined Sweden and a handful of other nations to
adopt consumption-based research perspectives (Csutora and
Mozner, 2012). Their ﬁndings suggest average consumption-based
emissions are 11% higher than production emissions in the EU 27
(Boitier, 2012) and 16% higher among OECD countries. In highly
afﬂuent and environmentally progressive nations like Sweden and
the UK, these differences exceed 30% (OECD, 2013).
The Swedish EPA report certainly called into question the
“winewin” claim that resource efﬁciencies and economic transi-
tions have resulted in a true decoupling of economic growth from
the ecological base (Berglund, 2011). Instead, the data provide
support for a “zero-sum”, world-systems scenario in which envi-
ronmental improvements and economic accumulation in one re-
gion were made possible by displacing the fulﬁllment of consumer
demand and the responsibility for associated pollution into
another (Bergman 2013; Berglund, 2011; Deitz and O'Neill, 2013;
Hornborg, 2009; Jackson, 2009; Mills and Waite, 2009; Sj€ostr€om
and €Ostblom, 2010; Stern, 2004). Channeling Harvey, we refer to
this process as “accumulation by displaced emissions”. Several
scholars have illustrated that emissions reductions are linked to
weak carbon leakage (Bruckner et al., 2010; Erickson et al., 2012;
Peters, 2008; Peters et al., 2012; Peters and Hertwich, 2008 Sato,
2012). In this process environmental damage is displaced due to
a deeply unequal global system, a dual shift in wealthy and
environmentally progressive economies toward both dematerial-
ized industry yet increasingly materialized lifestyles, and the
associated movement of environmentally damaging industries
into countries with fewer labor protections and environmental
regulations.
In the context of globalization, which geographically separates
consumers from the environmental impacts of their lifestyles,
Gupta has written, “transnational trade is one of the most effective
ways to transmit the ecological costs of overconsumption onto
others” (1998:304). In 2010 these perspectives on ecologically un-
even exchange (Foster, 2000; Hornborg, 2009; Martinez-Alier,
1987) and the climate impact of rising levels of consumption
made their way into Sweden's national system of 16 measurable
and closely tracked environmental objectives which were modiﬁed
to include an overarching “generational goal” which states,
“Our goal is to hand over to the next generation a society in which
the major environmental problems in Sweden have been solved,
and that this should be done without increasing environmental and
health problems outside Sweden's borders” (SEPA 2010:1).
The Swedish EPA was tasked with developing indicators for
measuring progress toward the generational goal (SEPA, 2012a). As
the environmental objectives commission (2013:1) stated,
“Policy instruments andmeasures to solve environmental problems
in Sweden must be designed to ensure that Sweden does not export
environmental problems … this calls for an ambitious environ-
mental policye in Sweden, in the EU and in international contexts”
Yet as acknowledged by the Swedish EPA, understanding how to
measure and achieve progress toward this goal “has not been self-
evident” (SEPA, 2012c). Not only is it quite difﬁcult to measure the
environmental impacts of complex global supply chains, but states
like Sweden have fewmeans by which to inﬂuence production and
environmental practices overseas, particularly if acting unilaterally
and without sparking trade disputes. Curious to see how the
ambitious generational goal might unfold we traced the develop-
ment of policy designed to support it through a series of iterative
interviews with environmental advisors at the Swedish EPA, the
Environmental Ministry and through a review of policy documents
published by these agencies between 2008 and 2014. The next
section outlines our ﬁndings.
3. Results: from knowledge and the “Generational Goal” to
policy
While the original mandate for the 2008 Swedish EPA report on
the climate impact of consumption included the development of
policy recommendations to compliment the descriptive data, the
scope was administratively revised by the head of the EPA. Ac-
cording to one of the report's authors, the EPA was concerned that
including policy recommendations would make the report too
political, even in Scandinavia where strong mainstream environ-
mentalism is well documented (European Commission, 2009a,
2009b; Gullestad, 1989; L€ofgren, 1995; Micheletti, 2003).
This prediction was likely correct given that the descriptive
research proved to be contentious. When the ﬁndings were pre-
sented at the Swedish EPA's annual Climate Forum in 2008, a
representative of Sweden's Centre Party vociferously critiqued the
report, calling it anti-market and a threat to the sustainability of the
Swedish economy. Another leader with the Ministry for the Envi-
ronment argued that the problem was not with Sweden's laudable
and ambitious investments in efﬁciency gains, but rather “dirty
production in China”.
Similar contentions around consumption-based approaches
have arisen in other national contexts (Petherick, 2012; Public
Interest Research Centre, 2011). In 2012 the UK Parliament pub-
lished a report in which they expressed concern that the UK was
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meeting their domestic carbon budget at the expense of increased
global emissions. The government quickly dismissed these ﬁndings
stating that they did “not agree … rather, the UK's domestic
achievements contribute to global progress” (Parliament, 2012: 1).
Further, climate ofﬁcials argued that a shift toward consumption-
based emissions could derail the UN climate negotiations or
cause an “absolute ﬁreﬁght” (UK House of Commons
Environmental Audit Committee, 2011). Indeed, contentions sur-
rounding consumption-based approaches remainwidespread. Sato
(2012:24) writes, that “Attempts in public policy to deviate away
from the conventional production-based carbon accounting
approach to account for EET [emissions embodied in trade] has
been met with hard opposition.” Certainly this opposition is as
diplomatic as it is ideological given the challenges of inﬂuencing
global supply chains without violating sovereignty or trade
agreements.
Nonetheless, there is a growing movement to start translating
the insights of consumption-based approaches into public policy at
varying scales. Barrett and colleagues' (2013) suggest that
consumption-based accounting be used alongside production- and
territorial-based metrics. The authors argue that in the absence of
universal carbon policy (which does not seem likely at least in the
short term) consumption-based emissions accounts are most
appropriately used at the state level to: help set emissions targets;
formulate policies to encourage more sustainable domestic con-
sumption patterns; and to establish international trade policy.
Similarly the EU's Sustainable Consumption and Production pro-
gram outlines a three-pronged approach: improving domestic
production efﬁciencies; educating for more sustainable consumer
choice; and providing technological assistance to developing
nations.
Sweden's response to date has closely mirrored these sugges-
tions. The following three sub-sections of this paper outline
movements toward 1) more ambitious emissions targets and en-
ergy efﬁciency programs; 2) consumer awareness campaigns and
voluntary programs designed to improve the efﬁciency of
contemporary consumption patterns and 3) international policy -
speciﬁcally via technological transfer to producer-nations such as
the People's Republic of China. In each section we also present the
barriers associated with these strategies and critically analyze e in
light of empirical sustainable consumption research - the likely
efﬁcacy of each.
3.1. Strategy one: emissions targets and energy-efﬁciency
improvements
Sweden has long invested in creating an economy built on
sustainable energy and its efﬁcient use. According to the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA) Sweden is a global leader in both low-
carbon intensity and proportion of renewables in total energy
supply. The Agency writes, “this is the result of continuous political
efforts: a stringent carbon dioxide and energy taxation, emissions
trading and the promotion of renewable energies” (2013:9).
Interviews with policy analysts at the Swedish EPA and repre-
sentatives of the Swedish Environmental Ministry suggest that the
consumption-based emissions report played at least an informal
role in setting future efﬁciency and emissions targets - largely
because it helped to raise awareness of the need to set more
ambitious goals to offset the emissions embedded in trade. At the
time of writing, Swedish targets mandate an additional 20%
reduction in energy intensity by 2020 and a 40% reduction in GHG
emissions by the same year, a more ambitious plan than that
recently promised by the EU. The IEA and Swedish government
suggest that the state is well positioned to achieve this transition
through “cost-effective market-based measures, consumer beneﬁts
and technological innovation” (IEA 2013:10). Yet many studies
suggest that the current emphasis on improved resource efﬁ-
ciencies, in Sweden and internationally, is unlikely to result in ab-
solute global reductions in resource use and associated
environmental impacts since efﬁciency gains tend to result in lower
prices, making additional production and consumption more
attractive (Jenkins et al., 2011), and given a signiﬁcant increase in
imports.
In order to avoid these “rebound effects” the Swedish EPA has
recognized the need to compliment domestic efﬁciency improve-
ments with a greater focus on demand-side policy, writing “so far,
policy instruments to mitigate the environmental impacts of con-
sumption and production have focused primarily on … product
manufacture” (2012d:86). We argue, and the EPA has recognized,
that technology “will not be enough” without “comprehensive”
life-style changes - a trend reversal that calls for “political resolve”
(SEPA, 2012c: 26). Over the past decade, growing recognition that
efﬁciency improvements are being rapidly outpaced by growth in
the emissions associated with household consumption has led to
an increased policy emphasis on educating for individual consumer
responsibility and sustainable lifestyles (Matti, 2009, Isenhour,
2010a,b).
3.2. Strategy two: consumer awareness and the rationalization of
contemporary lifestyles
In Sweden, demand-side policies have focused on increasing
consumer awareness and developing incentives designed to
“nudge” individuals to voluntarily make better choices on the
market (e.g. turning off the lights, efﬁcient appliances, green ap-
pliances and alternative transport) (Isenhour, 2010b; Matti 2009).
Many Swedes have responded. As a citizenry Swedes are relatively
sensitive to climate concerns (EC, 2013) and messages about con-
sumer responsibility (Isenhour, 2010a,b). In 2013 81% of Swedes
responded that climate change was the most serious problem fac-
ing the world, compared to 50% for the rest of the EU (EC, 2013).
More recently 100% of Swedes agreed that protecting the envi-
ronment is important and 96% believe that they can play a role
(EEA, 2014). Given this high level of engagement and perceived
self-efﬁcacy, one might expect more sustainable consumption
patterns to emerge e if anywhere e in Sweden.
Certainly awareness efforts and voluntary programs like ecola-
bels are positive in many ways (Spaargaren, 2003) but a signiﬁcant
body of research suggests that decades of consumer awareness
campaigns have failed to produce sustainable consumption pat-
terns in Sweden or elsewhere. Scholars have long observed that
heightened levels of awareness and pro-environmental attitudes
do not always translate into sustainable behavior (€Olander and
Thøgersen, 1995). Even highly aware and committed consumers
are inconsistent, ambivalent, confused and conﬂicted (Halkier,
2001; Isenhour, 2010b; Sassatelli, 2006). There is also signiﬁcant
evidence to suggests that consumers are already overwhelmed by
an abundance of information and choices (Shreck, 2008; Wilk,
2010). The preconditions for sustainable consumption are often
not in-place and signiﬁcant barriers get in the way (World Council
for Sustainable Business, 2008).
Perhaps more disturbing, pro-environmental behaviors don't
always translate into appreciable reductions in environmental
impact (Alfredsson, 2004; Connolly and Prothero, 2008; Wilk,
2010). Csutora's 2013 study, for example, compared the ecological
impact of “brown” consumers, who don't report environmental
concern or action, with “green” consumers. She found that despite
signiﬁcant differences in awareness and behavior, there was no
clear pattern in ecological impact. Similarly Alfredsson, using an
extensive database of 1000 Swedish households, concluded that
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household adoption of “green consumption” does not appreciably
reduce GHG emissions without reductions in total consumption
since families often reallocate efﬁciency-generated savings to the
purchase of goods with higher embedded emissions (2004).
These ﬁndings are not presented to suggest that consumer ed-
ucation, awareness and action aren't, like efﬁciency gains, also
important. They are crucial for building policy legitimacy (Halkier,
1999) and provide essential “gestures of change” that can drive
more signiﬁcant actions (Sassatelli, 2006). But it is to say that the
movement toward educating for voluntary market-based con-
sumer responsibility will likely not be enough. Certainly policy
makers and marketers cannot expect consumers to take on the
responsibility of ensuring sustainability if there are barriers that
even those who are educated, aware and engaged cannot overcome
(Isenhour, 2010a, b; Press and Arnould, 2009; Wilk and Wilhite,
1984). Policies are needed to address these barriers and ensure
that all consumers can reduce their impact rather than placing the
burden for environmental welfare on a minority of committed
individuals.
Drawing on an analysis of the drivers and barriers to pro-
environmental behaviors in Sweden (S€oderholm, 2011), the
Swedish EPA also acknowledged in a 2012 report that “information
is not enough” (2012d). The agency noted that educational pro-
grams and informational labels are individualizing while environ-
mental problems require a collective approach, applied equally to
all citizens in order to eliminate feelings of inequality, relative
depravation or incentives to free ride. Similar conclusions have
been reached by consumption scholars (€Olander and Thøgersen,
1995) and the UK government which concluded, “non-regulatory
measures used in isolation including nudges, are less likely to be
effective” (Hobson, 2013a citing UK House of Lords 2011:5).
Despite this widespread recognition of the need for more
aggressivedemand-sidepolicybysustainable consumption scholars
andagrowingnumberof policymakers, notions of consumerchoice,
freedom and sovereignty are so thoroughly engrained (Wilk, 2010),
that policies which seek to move beyond voluntary choice are un-
popular (Attari et al., 2009). John Barrett has argued that most
governments, regardless of “political persuasion” do not have a
“strong appetite” for taxingor restricting the sale of carbon intensive
products. As such national level policies designed to reduce or
redirect consumer demand remain almost “entirely absent, both in
Sweden and in other countries” (Naturvårdverket, 2011). Further,
efforts to deﬁne “a sustainable level of consumption and how to
achieve it are typically not well understood by policy makers,
business leaders or the general public” (Allaway, 2012: 18).
Barret argues, “There might be a greater justiﬁcation for tech-
nology transfer being funded by developed countries, because
China would argue that a third of its emissions are exported” (Rees,
2011:1). Given the “sociopolitical unpalatability” (Hobson, 2013a:
1084) of addressing growing consumption levels and standards of
living at home, the Swedish government has, as Barrett predicted,
recently directed signiﬁcant efforts up the supply chain by
providing technological assistance to developing producer coun-
tries. These efforts are intended to address the energy and carbon
intensity of the goods and services Swedes import rather than
domestic consumption levels.
3.3. Strategy three: “Taming the dragon” through SINO-SWEDISH
climate cooperation
While Sweden engages in environmental technology transfer in
a wide array international contexts, we focus here on Sino-Swedish
exchange. As the world's largest absolute emitter of CO2 emissions,
China is under signiﬁcant pressure to reduce emissions. Indeed, it is
common to hear politicians cite China as “the real source of the
climate problem” as did the ofﬁcial at the 2008 Climate Forum in
Stockholm. During interviews in Sweden, a representative of the
Swedish Environmental Ministry suggested the need to, as he
phrased it “tame” the Chinese dragon. His analogy was extended
further through several references to CO2 emissions as “dragon
breath”. Certainly China has a signiﬁcant role to play. An analysis by
the International Energy Agency suggested that Chinese national
policy could result in approximately 25% of the global emissions
reductions necessary by 2020 (IEA, 2009).
However, it must also be recognized that a signiﬁcant share of
China's emissions are associated with production for foreign com-
panies and of goods and services bound for foreign markets. Sato's
review of consumption-based emissions suggests that, between 22
and 45% of China's emissions are associated with exports (2012).
Drawing on these carbon exchanges, China has openly expressed
support for the inclusion of consumption-based emissions in in-
ternational climate negotiations. Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin
Gang stated “The developed countries move a lot of manufacturing
industry into China. A lot of the things you wear, you use, you eat
are produced in China. On the one hand, you shall increase the
production in China, on the other hand you criticize China on the
emission reduction issue” (New York Times, 2007).
To illustrate the carbon imbalance in Sino-Swedish trade we ran
an environmentally-extended multiregion input output (MRIO)
analysis of CO2, utilizing data from the World Input Output Data-
base (Fig. 2).1 Our analysis shows that between 1995 and 2009 the
CO2 emissions released in China but associated with Swedish
consumption rose by more than 600%. While the trade-embedded
emissions associated with Swedish exports to China also increased
during the same time period, there remains a signiﬁcant trade
imbalance for which China is currently held responsible. One must
also keep in mind these ﬁgures are only associated with Sino-
Swedish trade. When all international trading partners are
accounted for, consumption in highly developed economies like
Sweden's results in a signiﬁcant international displacement of
emissions and a carbon burden for producer countries.
Fig. 2. CO2 emissions embedded in Sino-Swedish trade 1995e2009.
1 The MRIO approach is a consumption-based accounting procedure that cap-
tures both direct and indirect emissions associated with consumption of a product,
business, region, or nation (See detail in Murray and Lenzen 2013). The approach
has been applied in many studies on calculating consumption-based CO2 emissions
and embodied carbon in supply chains at both subnational, national and global
scales (e.g. Davis and Caldeira, 2010; Feng et al., 2013; Peters et al., 2011). In this
study, global MRIO tables sectoral level CO2 emissions from 1995 to 2009 are
collected from WIOD database (WIOD 2012).
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The authors of The Climate Impact of Swedish Consumption
(2008/2010) have suggested that their estimates of consumption-
based emissions are likely conservative given that many Swedish
imports come from their closest trading partners in Europe -yet
many of these products were previously imported from nations
with much more carbon intensive production (SEPA 2010). While
we focus on imports from China in this analysis, we use it only as an
illustration to animate the policy formation process. Swedish im-
ports increased by 40% between 2000 and 2008 e with products
linked to emissions released not just in China, but all over the globe.
The Swedish State, having recognized: 1) that growing con-
sumption levels were cannibalizing domestic efﬁciency gains and
contributing to net growth in global emissions; 2) the political and
trade-based difﬁculty of limiting the consumption of carbon
intensive products among its citizenry; and 3) the inability to
achieve the generational goal without addressing either domestic
consumption levels or the carbon intensity of the products they
import e has implemented an aggressive program to provide in-
ternational environmental technology assistance. While Sweden is
investing in energy efﬁciency technology transfers in a number of
international contexts we focus here on China, where Sweden has
invested signiﬁcant effort.
Sweden and China share a deep history of bi-lateral partnership,
dating back to 1847 when the two nations signed an agreement on
trade and friendship. Perhaps more importantly, Sweden was the
ﬁrst western nation to recognize and develop diplomatic relations
with the People's Republic of China in the 1950s. Building on this
strong history of cooperative partnership, the Swedish government
set up the Center for Environmental Technology (CENTEC) at their
Embassy in Beijing with funding from the Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). The Center's mission
focuses on promoting and facilitating Chinese and Swedish ex-
change of “envirotech” in both the private and public sectors. Ac-
cording to SIDA the overall objective of the center was to
“contribute to the decrease of carbon dioxide emissions in China
and to improve the living conditions at large” (Froberg et al.,
2013:8), but the Swedish EPA has also stated that envirotech ex-
ports and SIDA's funding for technological exchange helps to
reduce the impact of Swedish consumption abroad.
CENTEC has helped to facilitate several cooperative agreements.
During a state visit by Prime Minister Reinfeldt in 2008 and a visit
from the Swedish Environment Minister in 2013, important re-
lationships were solidiﬁed leading to the establishment of working
groups for cooperation on sustainable urban development and
energy efﬁciency.
CENTEC facilitated the export of Swedish environmental tech-
nologies valued at approximately 37 million USD2 between 2008
and 2012 (Froberg et al., 2013:8). Some high proﬁle Swedish envi-
ronmental technology transfer “success stories” include energy
efﬁcient ventilation systems in Beijing's iconic CCTV tower and a
highly efﬁcient heat pump in the Olympic Village.3 But as the
former CENTEC director quickly points out, this is just a small piece
of the picture as it doesn't account for trade which occurred
without CENTEC facilitation or transfers made through the Clean
Development Mechanism. Indeed the export of environmental
technologies has been seen as a key area of growth for the Swedish
state, one that is consistent with the concept of a “green economy”
designed to achieve economic growth while contributing to the
development of less damaging systems of production and con-
sumption. In 2007 alone Swedish environmental technology ex-
ports totaled approximately 4.8 billion USD (Fig. 3).4
This assistance is also consistent with China's increasingly
ambitious energy efﬁciency and decoupling goals. While China's
emissions growth was staggering in the ﬁrst decade of the 21st
century, largely due to coal exploitation, in 2009 China announced
a target to reduce the carbon intensity of their economy by 40e45%
of 2005 levels and to use non-fossil fuels for approximately 15% of
its primary energy consumption by the end of 2020. During China's
11th ﬁve year plan they achieved a 19% reduction in energy in-
tensity and have set a goal for the 12th Five Year Guidance to reduce
CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 17%. President Xi Jinping, who
rose to power in 2012, has afﬁrmed a commitment to these
Fig. 3. The Ambassador explains Swedish enviro-tech at EnerChina 2014. Photo Author, Beijing 2014.
2 Calculated via Forex 5 year average exchange rate 2008e2012 of 6.93.
3 For additional Swedish enviro-tech success stories visit http://www.
swedenvirotech.se/en/china/Success-stories/?c¼energy.
4 Calculated via Forex average exchange rate for 2007 of 6.75.
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improvements, at least in rhetoric, stating that China “will not
sacriﬁce the environment for short term economic gain” (Xinhua
News Agency, 2013). Chapter 21 of the current ﬁve year guidance
states that the plan will:
“Reasonably restrict energy consumption, decrease the growth of
industries with high energy consumption, and increase energy ef-
ﬁciency. The plan will strengthen energy conservation assessment
responsibilities, complete energy-saving regulations and standards,
improve market mechanisms and implement pivotal energy-saving
projects … In addition, it will persist in common but differentiated
principles of liability and vigorously launch international cooper-
ation in response to global climate change” (BCCC 2011)
In this policy document and others, China clearly emphasizes
the “common but differentiated responsibilities” framework set up
under the Kyoto protocol which called on developed nations to act
ﬁrst to reduce emissions e given their historical responsibilities for
atmospheric carbon concentrations and developing nations' right
to development. While the United Nations is currently working
toward an undifferentiated and “legally binding” framework and
the US and China have recently signed a deal to limit emissions,
Chinese policy has long encouraged foreign governments to utilize
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This tool provides
developed countries the opportunity to meet emissions targets by
investing in cost-effective projects in developing countries.
China hosts the largest CDM market in the world. By 2011 the
PRC's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) had
approved more than 3000 CDM projects, constituting 42% of all
registered projects internationally (Buhr et al., 2012). Most inter-
esting with regard to our point here is that the Chinese government
placed signiﬁcant priority on energy efﬁciency improvements. Due
to this emphasis the number of energy efﬁciency CDM projects has
increased rapidly, by tenfold since 2006 (Buhr et al., 2012).
International technological diffusion is certainly positive in
many ways. It allows Sweden to work toward its generational goal
by inﬂuencing, even if indirectly, the carbon intensity of the
products and services it imports. Further, it can do this in a coop-
erativeway, without the complex governance challenges associated
with unilateral border adjustment taxes or domestic restrictions on
carbon-intensive products which could potentially damage de-
mand for products from developing contexts.
Yet the focus on international technological assistance raises a
familiar set of critical questions about whether or not efﬁciency
improvements (international and domestic) can result in a decou-
pling of economic growth and environmental deteriorationwithout
addressing rapid consumption growth. As the Chinese State
aggressively works to encourage urbanization and the develop-
ment of domestic markets, signiﬁcant growth in consumption is
projected. Certainly many Chinese citizens desperately need to
consume more and the nation has a right to development. How-
ever, it is reasonable to ask if Sweden's attempt to counteract the
climate impact of their own consumption through the diffusion of
energy efﬁcient technologies into China simply rationalizes accel-
erated consumption and a globalized rebound effect.
Tim Jackson argues it is essential to make a clear distinction be-
tween “relative” and “absolute” decoupling. Relative decoupling, for
which there is some evidence, refers to CO2 per unit of GDP but only
tells us that emissions have been reduced relative to economic
growth.Relativedecouplingdoesn'tnecessarily tell usanythingabout
net reductions or “absolute” global reductions of CO2. Jacksonwrites
that for absolute decoupling to work “resource efﬁciencies must in-
crease at least as fast as economic output” (2009:70, emphasis ours).
Global emissions of CO2 associated with fossil fuel combustion
have increased by 80 percent since 1970. In 2012 the amount of CO2
in the atmosphere grew by 2.2 parts per million, a rate of change
greater than the growth in the previous ten years combined (WMO,
2013). In order to achieve the emissions reductions needed to avoid
exceeding two degrees of change, Jackson has modeled the global
technological improvements given .7% annual population growth
and 1.4% annual income growth. He suggests a 21-fold improve-
ment in the carbon intensity of the economywould be necessary by
2050. This, in turn, would require technological improvements to
be implemented 10 times faster than current rates (2009:80).
Jackson writes, the sheer scale of decoupling required to meet the
limits set out … staggers the imagination” (ibid 14). That said,
Jackson concedes that the evidence does not “rule out the possi-
bility entirely” if technological shifts are matched with rapid in-
ternational diffusion, progressive policy and a “wholesale change” in
consumer demand (2009: 75 emphasis ours).
4. Beyond the green economy: discussion
The need to compliment efﬁciency efforts with policies to
address absolute consumption in the world's most afﬂuent soci-
eties is well recognized by sustainable consumption scholars and
international governance institutions (Dauvergne 2010, Princen
2002, Lorek and Fuchs, 2013, Hobson, 2013b). Yet the political
precariousness of these ideas and the complex governance chal-
lenges associated with regulating international production pro-
cesses have limited policy, even in one of the most environmentally
progressive nations in the world, to the reinvention of consumer
awareness campaigns and an international extension of decoupling
strategies e both of uncertain efﬁcacy.
Sweden's focus on Chinese production and consumption efﬁ-
ciencies, while neither unimportant nor inconsequential, consti-
tutes an international extension of their long-standing emphasis on
technological improvements and reafﬁrms the nation's commit-
ment to decoupling. Efﬁciency gains are certainly an important part
of the solution Laitner et al. (2012). But by focusing on Chinese
producers, rather than Swedish consumers, the Swedish state has
diverted attention away from the objective impacts of ongoing
growth in consumer demand. Thus the question remains whether
or not this “doubling down” on decoupling efforts will be enough to
help Sweden achieve its generational goal. The claim that the
economy can be separated from the environment is not well sup-
ported, particularly if we view consumption and production pro-
cesses as interdependent and recognize that greenhouse gas
emissions are not bound by geopolitical borders.
Current Swedish efforts to encourage consumers to reduce the
energy, materials and emissions embodied in the products and
services they buy are primarily channeled through informational
labels and educational campaigns. Indeed, most consumption-
based studies like the Swedish EPA's “The Climate Impact of
Swedish Consumption” have been utilized to increase consumer
awareness while speciﬁc policy formation has taken “a secondary
role” (Barrett, 2004:236). This trend has also been noted in the UK
where the PIRC comments “it is particularly ironic given that while
75% of the UK's carbon footprint is associatedwith the products and
services its citizens consume, ofﬁcial policy is focused over-
whelmingly on the other 25% of direct emissions” (PIRC, 2012:5).
Certainly Sweden is leading the international movement toward
a greater recognition of the climate impact of consumption.
Recently the Swedish EPA advocated “putting a price on adverse
environmental impacts” and indicated that the Swedish Govern-
ment has begun work on the valuation of ecosystem services
(2012a:20). Yet it remains unclear how costs will be included in
pricing mechanisms. A recent report suggested that policies to
reduce meat consumption might include ﬁnancial instruments
such as a bonus malus tax intended to subsidize the price of less
C. Isenhour, K. Feng / Journal of Cleaner Production 134 (2016) 320e329326
carbon intensive products with a tax on less favorable options
(SEPA, 2011: 46). Several policy makers and scholars have also
proposed carbon-based border tariffs designed to eliminate the
competitive advantage of cheaper imports (O'Sullivan, 2012,
Carmody, 2011). But these debates are contentious and seem un-
likely to be resolved soon. Opponents claim they would restrict free
trade and potentially result in signiﬁcant export losses for devel-
oping countries (Mattoo et al., 2009). Proponents argue these WTO
compliant measures (WTO, 2009) could be balanced by domestic
GHG taxes (Monjon and Quirion, 2011) or fed back into the Clean
Development Mechanism (Peters and Hertwich, 2008). Border
adjustments would give consumers a better sense of the true costs
of consumptionwhile encouraging producers to innovate to remain
competitive.
Despite these potential advantages, national governments have
been hesitant to act unilaterally given the potential to damage
trade. Sweden is a highly afﬂuent and wealthy nation with one of
the most competitive economies in the EU (World Economic
Forum, 2010). Global competitiveness and economic growth are
key priorities. While Sweden and many European nations have
tempered their acceptance of free-market policies with robust state
coordination (de Grazia, 2005, O'Dell, 1997), policies which limit
the market or consumer choice are seen as an affront to the capi-
talist logics of competition, free choice, accumulation and growthe
and are thus politically precarious for elected ofﬁcials.
5. Conclusion
We have argued that Swedish decoupling efforts, both at home
and overseas, are unlikely to ensure the achievement of the
“generational goal” without more ambitious and effective demand-
side policy. Consumption policy that moves beyond awareness
campaigns and individualizing calls for smarter consumption have
thepotential toplaya key roleGHGmitigation strategies (Druckman
and Jackson, 2010; Weber and Matthews, 2008) e affecting more
emissions globally because they are so precisely targeted at the site
of demand and highest impact (Peters, 2008; Sato, 2012). Policy
ideas designed to reduce total consumption do exist (e.g. Deitz and
O'neill, 2013, Fuchs and Lorek, 2005). In addition to pricing mech-
anisms that include the full ecological and social costs of production,
policies ideas range from hard restrictions on the sale of single use
and highly carbon-intensive products to investments in collabora-
tive consumption, sharing economies, repair and redesign in-
dustries, and legal protections for product service agreements.
It is encouraging that consumption-based perspectives are
driving signiﬁcant discussions about the necessity for “stronger”
sustainability policy. As Barrett and his colleagues write, “Even
though consumption has been a long-neglected topic in dominant
environmental discourse there are indications that it is now mov-
ing closer to the center of contemporary policy-making”
(2006:246). The European Union's 7th Environmental Action Plan,
for example, states that by 2020 “structural changes in production,
technology and innovation, as well as consumption patterns and
lifestyles have reduced the overall environmental impact of pro-
duction and consumption, in particular in the food, housing and
mobility sectors” (EU, 2013). This plan, like Sweden's generational
goal, takes important new steps toward sustainable production and
consumption by attempting to set targets for lifecycle environ-
mental impacts from consumption (EEA, 2014). The EEA, in its 2014
Environmental Indicators Report, has already begun the work of
developing indicators and policy recommendations for addressing
consumption in three product sectors with signiﬁcant climate
impact: electronics, clothing and food (EEA, 2014).
While the suggestion that we need to reduce consumption may
seem to have impractical economic implications, it certainly makes
sense givenwhatwe knowabout the impracticality of continuing to
dismiss the growing costs of ecological overshoot, resource
degradation and the concentration of greenhouse gasses in our
atmosphere. Further, as we hope has been made clear, displaced
emissions are also linked to issues of justice. The evidence is
mounting and is becoming increasingly hard to ignore.
Consumption-based approaches support the assertion that afﬂuent
lifestyles and prosperity continue to be supported by the ability to
outsource emissions, consume artiﬁcially cheap products, and
allocate environmental consequences to those whose need for
development leaves them with a constrained set of options.
Sweden has recognized this displacement and is attempting to
move beyond the simplistic assumption that our economies can be
separated from our natural resource base. Decoupling ideology,
which paints environmental and economic policy as independent
and unlinked, can be extremely misleading given the dual trend
toward the dematerialization of industry yet increased import-
based materialization of lifestyles in wealthy and environmentally
progressive contexts. As long as environmental and economic
policy are viewed as separate efforts, policies designed to protect
our environment and ensure a sufﬁcient level of consumption for
the citizens of both developing and developed nations will likely
continue to take a backseat to economic interests.
We don't suggest that any of these issues are straightforward or
simple to solve. They are wicked problems in part because eco-
nomic and environmental concerns are so intimately linked. For
this reason we suggest that action in macro and trade policy is
unlikely at least in the short term. Our point is that efﬁciency gains
both at home and abroad, must be complimented by reduced
consumption in the most afﬂuent economies to allow for devel-
opment where it is needed and to avoid dangerous climate change.
Demand-side policies that encourage and incentivize repair and
reuse, for example, make sense, would be relatively easy to
implement and also provide economic and social beneﬁt. They may
result in some contraction, but of course a growing number of
scholars argue that movement toward a steady state is wise for
highly developed economies like Sweden's, at least until techno-
logical improvements catch up with growth.
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